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Abstract 
This study explores within-district fiscal resource allocation across elementary 
schools in Texas and Ohio large city school districts and in their surrounding 
metropolitan areas. Specifically, I ask whether districts widely reported as achieving 
greater resource equity through adoption of Weighted Student Funding (WSF) have 
in fact done so. I compare Houston Independent School District (a WSF district) 
to other large Texas cities and Cincinnati (also using WSF) to other large Ohio 
cities. Using a conventional expenditure function approach, I evaluate the 
sensitivity of elementary school budgets to special education populations, poverty 
rates, and school size. Next, I estimate two-stage least squares cost functions across 
schools to evaluate the relative costs of achieving average outcomes with respect to 
varied poverty rates within and across school districts within metropolitan areas. I 
use these estimates to evaluate whether urban core schools on average spend 
sufficient resources to compete with neighboring schools in other districts in the 
same Core Based Statistical Area. I find first that widely reported WSF success 
stories provide no more predictable funding with respect to student needs than 
other large urban districts in the same state. I also find that in some cases, resource 
levels in urban core elementary schools are relatively insufficient for competing 
with schools in neighboring districts to achieve comparable outcomes. 
Keywords: education finance; budgeting; educational equity (finance); cost indices. 
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Índices distritales de asignación de recursos y costes marginales de proveer 
prestación igualdad de oportunidades educativas: Evidencias de Texas y 
Ohio 
Resumen 
Este estudio explora la asignación de recursos fiscales intra distritales en los 
distritos escolares de las escuelas primarias de ciudades y áreas metropolitanas de 
Texas y Ohio. En concreto, se investigó hasta que punto los distritos que 
informaron ampliamente haber logrado una mayor equidad de recursos mediante la 
adopción del programa de Financiamiento Estudiantil Ponderado (en inglés 
Weighted Student Funding FSM), lo consiguieron. Para eso se compararon el 
Distrito Escolar Independiente de Houston (un distrito FSM) con otras grandes 
ciudades de Texas y Distrito Escolar de Cincinnati (también utilizando FSM) con 
otras grandes ciudades de Ohio. Utilizando el enfoque de función convencional de 
gastos, evalúe la sensibilidad de los presupuestos de las escuelas primarias con 
respecto de la población que recibe educación especial, los índices de pobreza, y 
tamaño escolar. A continuación, se estimo en dos etapas los cuadrados menores de 
las funciones de costo en las escuelas para evaluar los costos relativos de obtener 
resultados aceptables con respecto a varias tasas de pobreza dentro y entre los 
distritos escolares en las zonas metropolitanas. Utilice estas estimaciones para 
evaluar si en promedio las escuelas de los núcleos urbanos gastaron recursos 
suficientes para competir con escuelas en otros distritos vecinos en un mismo 
Núcleo Basado en Área Estadística (en inglés Core Based Statistical Area). En 
primer lugar, encontré que la información ampliamente reportada acerca del éxito 
de las FSM historias no proporciona una financiación más previsible con respecto a 
las necesidades de los estudiantes que la proporcionada por otros distritos urbanos 
grandes en un mismo estado. También encontré que en algunos casos, los niveles 
de recursos en el núcleo urbano de las escuelas son relativamente insuficiente para 
lograr resultados comparables a los de las escuelas en distritos vecinos. 
Palabras clave: Educación Finanzas, Presupuesto, Equidad de la Educación 
(Finanzas), Índices de Costo. 
Introduction 
The call for fair and equitable funding across schools within large school districts has 
increased in recent years. This current reform wave, promoted as having both liberal and 
conservative political appeal, combines an approach called Weighted Student Funding (WSF) with 
decentralized governance including site based budgeting and management (Fund the Child, 2006). 
Several large school districts including New York City, Washington, DC and the state of Hawaii 
(which operates as a single district) have jumped on this bandwagon. In short, weighted student 
funding formulas are used to estimate school based budgets based on the different needs of children 
across schools and decentralized governance intended to provide school leaders—principals and 
school-based planning teams—greater latitude over the use of those funds. From a liberal 
perspective, the provision of need-based aid directly to schools can resolve substantial within-
district, cross-school disparities in resources that have been documented for decades. From a 
conservative perspective, decentralized governance is perceived to promote efficiency and foster 
school choice. Coupling the two creates both wide appeal and broad-based resistance.  
Within-District Resource Allocation 3 
It seems logical that if the state of New York should be obligated to fund the New York City 
schools at higher levels than other districts in the state because of greater needs, that the city school 
system should be obligated to fund higher need children and schools at higher levels within the city, 
especially given that New York City serves over one-third of the state’s children across many diverse 
educational settings within the district.1 Several authors have documented that the within-district 
flow of resources to schools with respect to student needs is less predictable and poorly understood 
in comparison to between-district allocation (Burke, 1999; Roza & Hill, 2003; Rubenstein, 1998).  
Much of the problem with current proposals for weighted student funding that are sweeping 
across large districts is that those proposals are being framed as inextricably linked to decentralized 
governance of schools, and decentralization of governance has taken center stage (Baker, 2007, 
2008). Needless to say, these two major components are separable but can be combined, with logical 
and fair resource allocation formulas to schools enabling decentralized governance. Unfortunately, 
the funding allocation formulas that enable decentralization have been presented as an afterthought, 
usually poorly conceived and highly politicized (Baker & Elmer, forthcoming). More often than not, 
the only evidence provided as a basis for weighted funding formula designs are current formulas in 
other cities and testimonials by advocates.2 Further, there exists only limited if any evidence on the 
more basic question of whether public school districts adopting weighted funding formulas have 
achieved any greater degree of within-district, cross-school funding equity and predictability than 
those opting for alternative budgeting approaches.  
Goals of this Article 
The analyses herein apply school-level data from large metropolitan areas in Ohio and Texas 
to address several questions: whether per-pupil expenditures across urban-district elementary 
schools are more predictable as a function of student needs when using weighted funding than when 
using other formulas; whether empirical analysis can guide the development of more rational 
weighted student formulas for targeting money to higher need schools in urban core districts; and 
whether urban core districts are in reasonable financial position to target resources according to 
need estimates.  
The first task at hand is to evaluate whether districts widely reported as successfully 
implementing Weighted Student Funding show any greater degree of equity in their cross-school 
within-district allocation of resources than other comparable districts. For comparability, I evaluate 
large urban districts within the same state, therefore operating under the same state policy structures 
for budgeting and accountability. I focus specifically on large cities in Ohio and Texas, where 
Cincinnati and Houston are two frequently cited Weighted Student Funding success stories in two 
states where school-level budget data have previously been evaluated.  
The second question is more complex, in that I move from evaluating “what is,” or current 
distributions of resources across schools within districts to evaluating “what should be,” or the ways 
in which resources should be distributed across schools to provide equal educational opportunity. I 
                                                 
1 As a point of clarification to this hypothetical statement, we note that the State of New York does 
not actually provide to New York City sufficient resources relative to their local competitive market 
(neighboring school districts in metropolitan area). This statement is merely to suggest that if the state did 
fully comply with the equal opportunity guidelines we present herein, that it would be a reasonable 
expectation that the district similarly comply in their distribution of resources across schools.  
2 See, for example, the January 2007 Fair Student Funding proposal (New York City Department of 
Education, n.d.).  
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adopt an equal educational opportunity framework that states that per pupil budgets should be 
adjusted across schools to provide children in each school with equal opportunity to achieve a 
specific outcome level (Baker & Green, 2008; Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). I base estimates on 
current average levels of performance for students attending same grade schools within each urban 
district and its surrounding metropolitan area. To generate these estimates, I apply education cost 
function models across elementary schools within the major metropolitan labor markets of Texas 
and Ohio (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). While most education cost modeling has attempted to 
measure differences in costs of achieving specific outcome targets across school districts in an effort 
to inform state school finance policies, some recent efforts attempt to estimate cost variation in 
relation to student needs across schools within districts (Baker & Thomas, 2006; Conley and 
Rooney, 2007; Stiefel, Schwartz, Iatarola, Chellman, 2007).  
Finally, to answer the third question, I address potential contextual constraints to 
implementing empirically driven weighted student funding formulas across schools within large 
urban core districts. I focus on the problem of per-pupil spending in schools in neighboring districts 
competing for teachers in the same labor market. Baker and Rebell (2006) explain that allocating 
need based budgets across schools within a high poverty urban core district may not be feasible if 
district resources are insufficient to provide competitive minimum budgets to the district’s lowest-
need schools, where sufficiency of budgets in the lowest-need urban core schools is contingent on 
per-pupil budgets of even lower-need schools in neighboring districts. That is, the lowest-need 
schools in the high poverty urban core require sufficient resources to compete in the teacher labor 
market with lower-poverty schools in neighboring districts.  
Research on Within-District Resource Allocation 
The study of within-district resource allocation in public education is not new. But, in recent 
years, separate and relatively disconnected lines of empirical work have emerged, applying diverse 
methods of widely varied rigor, with several recent studies more focused on advocacy than accuracy. 
Studies conducted in the 1990s found significant disparities in resources within districts. In 
particular, Burke (1999) shows how in Illinois and New York, gini coefficients estimated for 
resource distributions at the school rather than district level reveal significant intra-district disparities 
that exceed inter-district disparities. Steifel, Rubenstein, and Berne (1998) analyzed school-level data 
from four large urban districts (Chicago, Fort Worth, New York, and Rochester) in an effort to 
measure within-district disparities in resources. Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Berne asked two basic 
questions. First, how much variation is there across school-level budgets within the districts? 
Second, to what extent is that variation associated with factors that may affect the costs of providing 
equal educational opportunity across those schools—most notably, rates of children in poverty? As 
with Burke (1999), the authors found significant variation in resources across schools within 
districts, but they also found that some of that variation was associated positively with poverty rates 
across schools. However, this finding was not systematic across settings or school types. For 
example, Rochester middle schools showed stronger positive relationships between poverty and 
resources than Rochester elementary or high schools. In follow-up research, Rubenstein, Schwartz, 
Stiefel, and Bel Hadj Amor (2007) confirm what is generally known about within-district resource 
inequity, coupled with what is known about the distribution of teachers by their qualifications across 
schools: “Using detailed data on school resources and student and school characteristics in New 
York City, Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio, we find that schools with higher percentages of poor 
pupils often receive more money and have more teachers per pupil, but the teachers tend to be less 
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educated and less well paid, with a particularly consistent pattern in New York City schools” 
(p. 532).  
Roza, Guin, and Davis (2007) evaluate the targeting of disaggregated financial resources 
across specific student populations, across schools and within large districts. In their most recent 
work, the authors estimate the average weights implied by existing allocations to specific 
populations, finding that those weights vary widely across schools. However, significant questions 
remain regarding the degrees of precision with which the authors were able to identify resources 
allocated to specific populations of students within schools. Roza and Hawley-Miles (2004) used 
school-level budget data on Houston and Cincinnati to evaluate whether resources for the general 
population of students and for specific populations were evenly distributed across schools. That is, 
did “regular education” students receive comparable funding in one elementary versus another in 
Houston, and did children in poverty receive comparable funding in one elementary versus another 
within the district? In short, the “what should be” benchmark in this analysis is that the child in 
poverty in one school should receive similar resources to the child in poverty in another school, and 
the gifted child in one school should receive similar resources to the gifted child in another school.  
The major conceptual shortcoming of this method is that it entirely fails to account for 
whether children in poverty or limited English proficient children receive any sufficient support 
across schools, or on average, whether schools with much higher poverty concentrations received 
higher levels of per pupil funding than those with lower poverty concentrations. A district could 
receive a perfect equity index score under this method by allocating $0 per poverty child across all 
schools and $1,000 per gifted child across all schools, ultimately driving thousands more per pupil in 
low-poverty schools serving larger gifted populations.3  
Using this approach, Roza and Hawley-Miles (2004) conclude that Cincinnati in particular 
had adjusted its formula toward “virtually eliminating inequity in its schools budgets, in part by 
eliminating the higher funding levels for the high cost school designs and other magnet programs” 
(p. 22). The authors attribute these changes to a shift from staffing-based budgets to weighted pupil 
funding, neglecting the possibility that similar changes could be possible through other budgeting 
approaches. Roza, Guin, Gross, and Deburgomaster (2007) apply the same analytical framework in 
an analysis of Texas school district budgets from 1994 to 2003. They note: “We then calculate a 
ratio, called a Weighted Student Index (WSI), of the actual funding received by each school to the 
funding we would expect if schools received the district’s average allocation for its particular mix of 
students” (p. 78). The authors then find significant disparities over time in cross-school allocation of 
resources to general and special populations, again implying an important role for weighted student 
funding as a remedy: “While we would not feel comfortable claiming, based on the analysis here, 
that student-based budgeting has been the cause of greater equity in Houston’s school funding 
system, findings do show that despite an initial increase in the coefficient of variation, Houston 
schools have over the longer term made modest improvements in equity since the strategy was put 
into place” (p. 73). 
Carr, Gray, and Holley (2007) adopt a more convoluted framework for making the claim 
that high-poverty Ohio school districts fail to allocate resources equitably across schools. First, Carr 
et al. select only 72 high-poverty districts as the target of their critique, but they fail to limit their 
sample to districts with sufficient numbers of comparable grade-level schools. Then Carr et al. 
estimate correlations between per-pupil budgets and poverty rates across schools, regardless of grade 
                                                 
3 In Cincinnati, for example, Baker (2007) shows that the correlation across schools between poverty 
rate and gifted student percent is -.88. 
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level, and tally the number of correlations that are positive and negative, regardless of district size.4 
Concurrently, Carr et al. estimate a “what should be” budget benchmark for each school assuming 
that districts should allocate resources using weights adopted in the state school finance formula, 
and tallying the count of correlations that should be positively related to poverty. That is, the state 
school finance formula is assumed to be a good representation of fairness across students. Baker and 
Green (2005) and Baker and Duncombe (2004) have shown this approach to be a particularly 
problematic assumption, where in at least some cases, state legislatures have adopted weighting 
systems that drive resources disproportionately to lower- rather than higher-need districts. The Carr 
et al. approach accepts as rational any policy adopted by state legislatures for allocating different 
levels of resources across schools.  
As with Roza and Hawley-Miles (2004), Carr et al. (2007) attribute the inequities they find to 
conventional “staffing based” budget systems, noting, “Districts, especially larger ones, tend to use 
staffing allocations to distribute funding. However, these allocations are often a result of central 
office decisions and collective bargaining agreements, which do not necessarily reflect student 
needs” (p. 1). Carr and colleagues then conclude, “Employing building-based budgeting is one 
mechanism to guarantee that wealthy schools within districts are not siphoning off the resources 
that have been appropriated to help close the achievement gap” (p. 1).  
Unfortunately, much of this recent highly politicized and methodologically problematic 
research seems to have drawn attention away from more rigorous and more conventional studies of 
within-district resource inequity and potential causes of that inequity. Further, this more recent 
advocacy research has made the bold leap toward the conclusion that weighted student funding is a 
logical if not the sole solution.  
Weighted Student Formulas in Practice 
Despite recent claims to the contrary (Fordham Institute, 2006), weighted student formulas 
are not new, dating back to school finance textbooks and state policies in the 1950s and earlier (e.g., 
Mort & Reusser, 1951). Weighted student formulas have existed for decades, primarily as 
mechanisms for delivering differentiated levels of state aid from state general funds to local public 
school districts. As stated previously, interest has more recently turned to the allocation of resources 
to schools within districts on a similar weighted pupil basis. The long track record of state-level 
weighted student funding provides numerous insights that should not be overlooked when applying 
the approach to within-district allocation, such as the extent to which those systems may become 
highly politicized and less-than-transparent over time, and in some cases erode rather than advance 
equity (Baker & Green, 2005). Recent adoptions of weighted student funding plans in Hawaii and 
New York City have resulted in a substantial confusion and misinformation over the goals and 
principles as well as the politics of weighted student funding.  
In a report commissioned by the Hawaii Board of Education, after the state legislature 
adopted a combination weighted funding and decentralized governance plan known as the 
Reinventing Education Act of 2004, Baker and Thomas (2006) provided a review of the structure 
of weighted student funding formulas in Seattle and Houston, as well as evaluating Hawaii proposals 
on the table in Spring/Summer 2006. However, Baker and Thomas (2006) also point out that such 
information should be considered the least (not most or only) reliable and valid source for designing 
                                                 
4 Baker (2007) explains how mixing schools of varied grade level and including districts which may 
have only one school at each grade level can produce erroneous results. 
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new policies, instead recommending reliance on a combination of existing research literature on 
marginal costs and statistical analysis of actual data on Hawaii public schools. 
Table 1 summarizes components of the weighted student formulas for Houston, Seattle, and 
Hawaii from the Baker and Thomas (2006) report, and the table also includes New York’s Fair 
Student Funding model. Notably, existing and proposed models reviewed by Baker and Thomas 
(2006) are little more than ad-hoc collections of block grants provided across schools coupled with 
arbitrarily set base per pupil funding and nominal adjustments for at-risk children and children with 
limited English language proficiency.  
 
Table 1 
Selected components of weighted funding formulas (elementary schools only) 
 
Houston,
2003–04
Seattle, 
2006–07 
Hawaii, Initial 
Proposal(2006) 
New York,
2007–08 
Assumed elementary enrollment $500 $250 N/A N/A 
Allocations outside of WSF formula     
Overhead foundation allotment    $869 (per pupil)
 $200,000 
(per school)
Other foundational (non-WSF)      
Head Start   $300   
Negotiated stipend   $1,000   
Title I distribution $371    
Small, isolated, or  
special schools 
Small 
Magnet 
 Isolated  
Weighted formula components     
Base pupil allotment $2,832 $3,019 $4,288 $3,788 
Grade level (elementary)  
adjustment  
  $373 variable  
Bilingual program yield $283 $916 $809 $1,515 
At-risk yield $357 $427 $429 $909 
Source: Selected components for Houston, Seattle and Hawaii from Baker and Thomas, 2006. New 
York information from the New York City Department of Education, available online from 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Offices/ChildrenFirst/FairStudentFunding/KeyElements/default.htm  
 
Seattle Public Schools recently abandoned its weighted student funding model, but it had 
used the model longest among the districts described in Table 1 (Seattle Public Schools, 2007). The 
Seattle model allocated a block grant (called a foundation allotment) to each elementary school in 
the amount of $217,177 for the basic operations of each elementary school of 250 students, or $869 
per pupil. Seattle then provided base funding for the weighted pupil formula of $3019, with $373 
added for elementary schools, bringing the base aid per pupil to $3,393 for elementary schools. The 
use of a separate foundation allocation in Seattle meant that as much as 26% (869/3393) of funding 
was allocated beyond the weighted formula. Such an option is typically a political concession to 
spread the wealth rather than target resources to higher-need schools—the espoused goal of 
weighted student funding. In 2006–07, elementary schools received an additional flat stipend of 
$1,000 beyond the weighted formula, further reducing need-based targeting of resources (Seattle 
Public Schools, 2006). Seattle’s yield per child qualifying for free or reduced lunch was $427 in 
2006–07, and for children in bilingual education programs, the per-child yield was $916 (about 27% 
over $3,393, but only 17% over $5262 [3393+869+1000]).  
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As of 2003–04, Houston allocated Title I resources and small and magnet school budget 
adjustments outside of the weighted formula. In 2003–04, the base aid within the weighted formula 
was $2,832, increased to $3,071 by 2007–08. Weights for bilingual education and at-risk children 
were notably lower in Houston than in Seattle. Houston’s at-risk allocations were based on a 
combination of test performance and qualifying for free or reduced lunch. As of spring 2006, the 
Hawaii board of education had established base aid of $4,288 per pupil, with bilingual program aid at 
$809 and at-risk weighting at $429. The formula also included adjustments for remote and/or 
isolated schools. Finally, at the time of initial phase-in, parameters on New York’s Fair Student 
Funding model included a $200,000 flat allotment per elementary school, a base aid figure of $3,788, 
a weight for English language learners of 40%, or $1,515 and a weight for children qualifying for 
free or reduced lunch (grades K-5) of 0.24. 
Needless to say, each data element in Table 1 represents a political decision. Each figure and 
calculation represents an opportunity to drive funding appropriately to higher need schools or 
districts, or alternatively, through political tug-of-war produce a funding system even less equitable 
than a simple flat allocation of per pupil funding across schools. Amazingly, despite the large sums 
of money involved, none of the implemented or proposed policies above were guided by empirical 
analysis of documented marginal costs for the student populations in question.5  
Sorting through Competing Methods  
Three questions are addressed herein, the first of which is whether some districts allocate 
their resources more equitably than others. That is, as in other studies, I address a “what is” question 
first. Next, I venture into more complicated ground by addressing a “what should be” question, 
attempting to estimate the margin of difference in the costs of providing equal opportunity to 
achieve specific educational outcomes across schools within large urban districts and other schools 
in the same major metropolitan area. Several published, peer-reviewed studies provide useful 
insights into methods that may be used for each purpose. In addition, Berne and Stiefel (1984) 
provide specific guidelines for evaluating current conditions, including both overall variations in 
resources across school settings and whether that variation is rationally associated with factors 
assumed to affect the costs of providing equal educational opportunity.  
Measuring Within-District Equity 
I reject outright recent studies that attempt to show whether children in poverty in one 
school are treated similar to children in poverty in another school in the same district regardless of 
whether that treatment is equitable compared to other children in the same district. I also reject 
outright the more convoluted and deceptive strategies proposed by Carr et al. (see Baker, 2007). 
Evaluating within-district equity is simpler and more straightforward than recent advocacy studies 
would imply. I decompose one within-district equity question into two questions, similar to the work 
of Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Berne (1998): Is there variance in spending across schools, and is the 
spending variance predictable as a function of well-understood cost factors, including student needs? 
The first of these questions is addressed simply by calculating the means, standard deviations, and 
coefficients of variation in per-pupil spending across regular elementary schools within each of the 
                                                 
5 In 2001 and again in 2004, the Texas Legislature commissioned statewide studies of cost variation 
across school districts in an attempt to inform the redesign of the state school finance formula.  
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districts in question and across the metropolitan area for each district. The second is addressed by 
estimating expenditure functions, or regression models in which school-level spending data are the 
dependent variable and various school cost and student-need-related cost measures are included as 
independent variables. This method was proposed by Berne and Stiefel (1984) and has been applied 
in numerous other studies through the years, including Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) in an 
evaluation of the rationality of Indiana’s Complexity Index, a tool used in the state funding formula 
for differentiating resources across districts.  
Estimating the Marginal Costs of Equal Opportunity 
Since the 1980s, two basic approaches have been applied to the measurement of education 
costs and variations in costs across settings and children: input-oriented approaches based on the 
resource cost model and outcome-oriented approaches based on statistical models of education 
spending and production of outcomes. Resource cost modeling strategies identify appropriate 
service delivery models for meeting the needs of varied student populations, where those service 
delivery models are based on estimates of the appropriate quantities and qualities of educational 
resources (e.g., Hartman, Bolton, & Monk, 2001). Central to resource cost estimates are the 
appropriate quantities and qualities of teachers required to achieve certain outcome objectives with 
certain students. Recent attempts to identify appropriate resource quantities and configurations have 
relied either on panels of education experts (professional judgment approach) or attempts to 
synthesize existing research on reform models and educational interventions (Baker, 2005).  
Alternatively, authors beginning with Garms and Smith (1970), and more recently Downes 
and Pogue (1994), Duncombe and Yinger, (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), 
Reschovsky and Imazeki (2004), and Gronberg, Jansen, Taylor, and Booker (2004) have applied 
statistical models associating education spending, outcomes, and various student demographic and 
district structural attributes to estimate the costs of achieving specific educational outcome levels 
and how those costs vary from one district to the next and from one child to the next. This method 
has become known as the Education Cost Function. In a review of cost analysis methods, Downes 
(2004) notes: “Given the econometric advances of the last decade, the cost function approach is the 
most likely to give accurate estimates of the within-state variation in the spending needed to attain 
the state's chosen standard, if the data are available and of a high quality” (p. 9). I apply this latter 
method to identify how costs associated with student needs vary across schools. 
Data and Methods 
Data for this study are from the states of Texas and Ohio and include school-based budget 
data from each state’s statewide financial reporting system. I focus specifically on regular elementary 
schools in large city school districts in Ohio and Texas. These include Cincinnati, Cleveland, and 
Columbus in Ohio and Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio in Texas.6 In certain analyses, I 
also include all other elementary schools that share the same Core Based Statistical Area with the 
urban core district. For Ohio, I focus on data from 2002 to 2007, and for Texas, from 2005 to 2007. 
In Ohio, Cincinnati is frequently cited as a weighted student funding success story (Roza & Hawley-
                                                 
6 For Texas cities, we select the largest “core” district within each major metropolitan Core Based 
Statistical Area (CBSA). For space purposes herein, we exclude Ft. Worth, the second largest district in the 
Dallas CBSA, but a district larger than others in our sample.  
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Miles, 2004) while Columbus is targeted as an example of grave disparities that should be corrected 
by court-ordered implementation of weighted student funding (Osberg, 2006).  
Table 2 (overleaf) provides a summary of the two school-level panel data sets. Each district 
has at least 40 regular elementary schools. In each case, the proportions of children qualifying for 
subsidized lunch are higher in the elementary schools in the urban core district than their 
surroundings, and in Ohio in particular, the concentration of Black students is much higher in the 
urban core elementary schools than in the surrounding area. In Texas districts, the Hispanic 
population share is higher. Regarding annual operating expenses per pupil, Ohio urban core 
elementary schools outspent other elementary schools in the same labor market. In Texas, spending 
differences between urban core and neighboring elementary schools were mixed, with Austin 
schools outspending their neighbors, but Dallas schools lagging behind.  
Overall variation in resources across schools within Ohio school districts is lowest in 
Cincinnati, the district that adopted weighted funding, and in Texas the overall variation in resources 
across schools was lowest in Houston and San Antonio; Houston had adopted weighted student 
funding. That said, overall lack of variation may not be a good thing, if student needs vary widely 
across schools. 
Expenditure and Cost Models 
I estimate two types of regression models on school-level spending herein. First, using data 
on the regular elementary schools within each large urban core district, I estimate an expenditure 
function where the goal is to determine whether existing variation in spending across schools within 
districts is a predictable function of major cost factors. Factors affecting the costs of providing equal 
educational opportunity across schools include economies of scale, or school size, and student 
population composition. Capturing variations in student population composition at the school level 
within large, poor urban districts is problematic. All of the elementary schools in the urban core 
districts have very high fractions of children qualifying for free and reduced lunch. In short, the 
income threshold used (185% poverty level) is too high to capture the variation across schools 
within these cities. In 2007, all Cleveland elementary schools reported 100% of students qualifying 
for free and reduced lunch. But the schools are substantively and statistically different from one 
another when considering a wider array of student population characteristics and multiple years of 
data. To better capture student population variation across schools, I estimate a separate model 
across all schools in the sample (urban core and others in the metro area) across metropolitan areas 
within state, and over multiple years, to generate a predicted at-risk index for each school. I estimate 
separate models for the Texas and Ohio metropolitan areas: 
At-risks = f(%Blacks , %Hispanics , %ELLs , Incomed , Colleged , CBSA) 
That is, I predicted reported subsidized lunch rates across all schools in the major core based 
statistical areas in each state as a function of school-level proportions Black, Hispanic, and 
English-language learning (ELL) (Ohio only), district-level median household income, 
proportion of adults with a college education, and a Core Based Statistical Area fixed effect for 
each CBSA within the state (3 in Ohio and 4 in Texas). For the expenditure functions, I use 
both the subsidized lunch measure and the predicted subsidized lunch, or At-Risk measure. The 
expenditure functions evaluating the current rationality of spending variation across schools may 
be expressed as follows:  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on elementary school matched panels 
 
Ohio (2002 to 2007) Texas (2005 to 2007) 
Variable Cincinnati* Cleveland Columbus Austin Dallas Houston* 
San 
Antonio 
Elementary schools        
District 40 62 76 56 110 140 54 
CBSA (excluding district) 158 226 186 67 481 343 158 
Students (2007)        
District 17,079 26,658 25,116 34,016 70,834 86,155 27,167 
CBSA  68,169 88,387 72,439 45,743 288,990 262,107 100,308 
% with free/reduced lunch        
District 72% 100% 66% 82% 91% 85% 92%
CBSA 30% 29% 25% 46% 55% 58% 64%
% Black        
District 71% 69% 58% 14% 26% 29% 6%
CBSA 10% 15% 7% 11% 18% 19% 8%
% Hispanic        
District 1% 13% 6% 71% 69% 62% 91%
CBSA  2% 3% 3% 43% 39% 45% 65%
Mean spending        
District $10,580 $9,867 $10,732 $6,232 $4,840 $5,896 $5,825 
CBSA  $8,585 $9,138 $8,227 $5,023 $5,546 $5,294 $5,857 
Coefficient of variation        
District 10% 17% 16% 15% 19% 11% 11%
CBSA  24% 26% 18% 14% 14% 13% 14%
*—District uses Weighted Student Funding. CSBA always excludes the named urban district. 
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Expends = f(Sizes , Disabilitys , At-risks , LEP/ELLs), 
where spending per pupil is expected to vary as a function of differences in the percent of 
children with disabilities across schools, differences in the percent of children on subsidized 
lunch or the at-risk index, and the percentages of children with limited English language 
proficiency (Ohio only).7 I also include two school size categorical variables, because spending 
per pupil is often a significant function of economies of scale. Extensive reviews of economies 
of scale in education suggest an optimal elementary school size between 300 and 500 students 
(Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2002). That said, within any large urban school district small, 
excessively costly small schools are arguably unnecessary and may create significant inequities. 
The spending functions are estimated entirely within each of the seven urban districts.  
 For the cost models, the goal is to capture existing relationships between spending variation 
across schools and outcome variation across schools to determine how spending is associated with 
achieving specific educational outcomes across different schools serving different student 
populations. For each state, the goal is to estimate a global model of these relationships for the 
sample elementary schools. That is, the goal is to estimate the average relationship between costs 
and student population characteristics at constant outcomes for the Ohio schools in one model and 
the Texas schools in another. In each state I include only those schools in the largest Core Based 
Statistical Areas. To capture the input-outcome relationship, the samples of schools must include 
sufficient variation in both inputs and outcomes. As such, I include in these models elementary 
schools both in the urban core and in neighboring districts in the same Core Based Statistical Area. 
The modified spending, or Cost function model may be expressed as follows:  
Expends = f(Outcomess , Sizes , Disabilitys , At-risks , LEP/ELLs , CBSA, Inefficiency) 
Here again, spending per pupil is in the position of the dependent variable. As previously noted, 
the goal is to discern how spending per pupil varies across schools as a function of school size 
and variation in disability shares, at-risk shares and children with limited English language 
proficiency. I also include a dummy variable for each Core Based Statistical Area to account for 
variation in labor costs and other potential unmeasured differences across labor markets within 
Texas and Ohio.  
In this case I also include a measure of the percentage of children scoring proficient or 
higher on state assessments. That is, I attempt to evaluate how spending varies across schools in 
relation to school size and student population characteristics, at constant outcome levels. The goal is 
to discern how much more or less must be spent, on average, to achieve specific outcomes. This 
approach raises two concerns. First, how might one control for the fact that some schools or 
                                                 
7 A reviewer of a related submitted article on this topic has suggested that the uneven distribution of 
children with disabilities, including uneven distribution of severity of disabilities might overwhelm the 
variation in spending across elementary schools making it difficult to discern the extent that other variation 
rationally underlies this variation. Two steps could be taken to better sort through this issue. First, one might 
more specifically disaggregate special education populations by disability type across schools. Our Texas data 
do not provide such precision, and while the Ohio data provide listings of the disaggregate groups in each 
school, enrollments are not listed when the total count is less than 10, which involves most cases of children 
with specific disabilities per school. Alternatively, one might simply pull out the special education program 
expenditures from each school budget and exclude the special education population variation. This step was 
feasible with our Texas data but not with our Ohio data. Baker and Arbuckle (2008, available on request) 
decompose the variance in per pupil spending by disability, poverty and scale in Texas schools. The results do 
not vary substantively from those herein.  
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districts on average spend more than necessary to achieve specific outcomes, or how does one 
account for potential spending inefficiency? And in addition, is it possible that the outcome 
measure, used as an independent variable, is partly a function of the dependent variable, spending, 
and also related to other independent variables in the model? That is, the outcome measure might be 
endogenous.  
Previous school-level cost function analyses have not attempted to account for endogeneity 
of outcomes and have used limited methods to account for variation in efficiency across schools 
(Baker & Thomas, 2006; Conley & Rooney, 2007). But, an extensive body of district-level cost 
function research has accounted for endogeneity of outcomes and has used indirect factors related 
to bureaucratic behavior of local governments as a method of capturing variations in inefficiency 
across districts (Duncombe & Yinger, 2008). In the present case, the sample of schools across 
districts within core based statistical areas is in part related to the desire to test the use of approaches 
from district cost modeling applied to school cost modeling. Previous school-level cost functions 
applying single stage (no endogenous outcomes), stochastic frontier (efficient cost frontier) models 
have yielded cost predictions relatively insensitive to student population characteristics and to 
outcome variation.  
Here, I apply a two-stage least squares cost function treating outcomes as endogenous, and I 
include in the models additional district-level variables attempting to capture variations in spending 
across schools not associated with variations in outcomes or the costs of improving outcomes—
indirect controls for efficiency, which in this context are simply an attempt to address omitted 
variables bias. Modeled without indirect controls for efficiency, I have a model of spending as a 
function of an outcome measure and factors associated with the costs of producing that outcome. 
But the spending measure likely varies across schools within the core based statistical areas as a 
function of more than just cost factors and desired outcomes. Spending variation neither associated 
with outcomes nor costs may be considered inefficiency (at least with respect to producing the 
measured outcomes). For example, spending may vary as a function of differences in the fiscal 
capacity of districts. Some districts within a core based statistical area may spend more on average 
across their schools than others, because they can—they have the fiscal capacity to do so. Where 
these spending differences are not associated with differences in outcomes, they may be considered 
inefficiencies. As such, one should attempt to account for them in the model. I test a variety of 
district-level factors to explain spending differences across schools unassociated with outcome 
differences and generally not considered to be cost factors.  
When treating outcomes as endogenous, one must find a set of exogenous instruments that 
may be used in generating predicted values of the outcome measure in the first-stage regression 
equation. Those instruments should be sufficiently related to the outcome measure but not related 
to the spending measure. As with the selection of indirect efficiency controls, instrument selection in 
education cost function modeling is perhaps more art than science. In the present case, I draw on 
recent work of Duncombe and Yinger, (2006, 2007a) and focus on characteristics of other 
elementary schools in the same district which may create pressure on student outcomes in a given 
school. In modeling district-level costs, Duncombe and Yinger (2006, 2007a) draw on characteristics 
of other school districts sharing labor markets or legislative districts. To evaluate model instruments, 
I apply standard statistical tests to evaluate instrument relevance (F-statistic on instruments) and 
overidentification (Hansen J, p-value), as discussed in Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995).  
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Findings 
In this section, I report the findings of the expenditure and cost functions. I begin with an 
evaluation of the extent to which within-district spending across elementary schools is a predictable 
function of student population characteristics. Next, I address models of the variation in costs 
across elementary schools of achieving average state performance outcomes. I conclude this section 
with graphic, descriptive analysis of the distribution of actual per pupil expenditures across metro 
area and urban core elementary schools, compared with the marginal costs of providing equal 
educational opportunity across all schools within each metropolitan area.  
Expenditure Function Results 
Table 3 summarizes Texas urban core district expenditure functions. For all cities, 
enrollment size is associated with spending variation, with schools enrolling under 500 or under 300 
students spending more on average than larger schools. As noted previously, size-related differences 
in spending should not necessarily exist within districts because inefficiently small schools should 
not necessarily exist at the expense of others. Size-related cost variation is greatest in Dallas. Overall, 
spending variation is least predictable within Dallas. Spending variation is most predictable in Austin 
and San Antonio. Austin displays the strongest positive relationship between school subsidized 
lunch rate and per-pupil spending. Houston also displays a positive relationship between spending 
and subsidized lunch or the predicted at-risk measure, but the magnitude of this relationship is 
smaller in Houston and overall spending variation is less predictable in Houston than in Austin.  
Table 4 displays expenditure models for Ohio districts. In Ohio, Cincinnati displays the least 
predictable patterns of variation in spending across schools and displays no relationship between 
subsidized lunch rates and spending. Only disability concentrations explain spending variation across 
Cincinnati schools. When using the predicted at-risk measure, spending is associated (p < .10) with 
at-risk concentrations in Cincinnati, but spending remains less predictable in Cincinnati than in 
Cleveland or Columbus. Columbus is the only Ohio city in this study to display a consistent positive 
relationship between poverty, the at-risk measure, and spending per pupil across elementary schools. 
Spending variation across Cleveland schools appears largely a function of disability concentration 
and of school size. As with Cincinnati, spending per pupil in Cleveland is marginally, positively 
associated with the predicted at-risk measure.  
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Table 3 
Texas district expenditure functions 
  Free/reduced lunch Predicted at-risk index 
Variable by city Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Dallas     
% Disability 0.61 0.59 0.42 0.60 
% at-risk 0.10 0.13 -0.25 0.18 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.42* 0.11 0.42* 0.11 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.33* 0.04 0.31* 0.04 
Constant 8.34* 0.12 8.65* 0.18 
R2 .44  .48  
Houston     
% Disability 1.35* 0.24 1.43* 0.24 
% at-risk 0.11* 0.03 0.16* 0.04 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.20* 0.06 0.20* 0.06 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.13* 0.01 0.12* 0.01 
Constant 8.40* 0.04 8.39* 0.05 
R2 .52  .56  
Austin     
% Disability 1.74* 0.36 1.84* 0.38 
% at-risk 0.24* 0.06 0.24* 0.08 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.25* 0.04 0.24* 0.04 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.13* 0.03 0.14* 0.03 
Constant 8.35* 0.06 8.33* 0.07 
R2 .73  .71  
San Antonio     
% Disability 1.67* 0.37 1.64* 0.37 
% at-risk -0.13 0.14 0.27 0.21 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.25* 0.03 0.25* 0.03 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.13* 0.02 0.12* 0.02 
Constant 8.52* 0.13 8.23* 0.20 
R2 .74  .74  
* p < .05 
Estimated with robust standard errors clustering schools over time 
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Table 4 
Ohio district expenditure functions 
   Free/reduced lunch Predicted at-risk index 
Variable by city Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Cincinnati     
% Disability 0.72* 0.28 0.60* 0.24 
% at-risk 0.02 0.09 0.25** 0.14 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Constant 9.04* 0.06 8.91* 0.09 
R2 .32  .37  
Columbus     
% Disability 0.91* 0.08 1.02* 0.09 
% at-risk 0.28* 0.06 0.38* 0.10 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.24* 0.05 0.26* 0.05 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.09** 0.05 0.11* 0.05 
Constant 8.73* 0.06 8.63* 0.08 
R2 .76  .73  
Cleveland     
% Disability 2.29* 0.20 2.27* 0.20 
% at-risk 2.56 2.43 0.21** 0.11 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.14* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.05* 0.03 0.06* 0.03 
Constant 6.57* 2.02 8.53* 0.10 
R2 .83  .84  
* p < .05 
Estimated with robust standard errors clustering schools over time 
Cost Models 
Table 5 displays the cost function estimates for Texas school districts. In both models, 
higher proficiency levels are positively associated with spending but far more sensitive to spending 
in the model that includes the predicted at-risk measure. I find evidence of school-size related cost 
variation and also find evidence of relatively strong positive relationships between subsidized lunch 
and costs and between the predicted at-risk measure and costs. Costs are somewhat more sensitive 
to the predicted at-risk measure than to subsidized lunch rates, perhaps because the predicted at-risk 
measure includes school racial composition (see Green, Baker, & Oluwole, 2007). Table 6 displays 
the Ohio cost model, including only the cost model using the predicted at-risk measure because of 
lack of variance in subsidized lunch rates in Cleveland. Again, performance outcomes are positively 
associated with per-pupil spending. As in Texas, holding outcomes constant, per-pupil costs are 
positively associated with the predicted at-risk measure and positively associated with the proportion 
of students with disabilities.  
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Table 5 
Texas school-level cost models 
  Free/Reduced Model Predicted at-risk 
 Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Potential cost factors     
% proficient (grades 3 & 4) 0.54* 0.21 1.50* 0.63 
% disability 1.38* 0.12 1.53* 0.17 
% at-risk 0.32* 0.06 0.59* 0.18 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.20* 0.03 0.21* 0.04 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.13* 0.01 0.16* 0.02 
District mean efficiency factors     
Students per school 0.05* 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
CBSA enrollment share 0.34* 0.07 0.61* 0.18 
Year     
2006 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
2007 0.03* 0.01 -0.003 0.02 
CSBA fixed effects     
Austin -0.003 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
San Antonio 0.001 0.01 -0.06** 0.03 
Dallas 0.007 0.01 0.009 0.01 
Constant 5.50* 0.93 1.60 2.72 
Partial F 23.60  5.05  
Hansen J (p-value) .56  .24  
* p < .05 
Estimated with robust standard errors clustering schools over time 
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Table 6 
Ohio districts cost model 
  At-risk model 
 Variable Coefficient SE 
Potential Cost Factors   
% proficient 0.23* 0.11 
% disability 1.16* 0.11 
% at-risk 0.70* 0.10 
Enroll 100 to 300 0.14* 0.02 
Enroll 300 to 500 0.06* 0.01 
District mean efficiency factors   
% adults with college Education 1.01* 0.05 
% aged 5–17 -0.92* 0.23 
Year   
2003 -0.06* 0.02 
2004 -0.04 0.03 
2005 -0.03 0.03 
2006 -0.01 0.04 
2007 0.03 0.03 
CBSA Fixed Effects   
Cleveland 0.01 0.01 
Columbus -0.01 0.01 
Constant 8.59 0.06 
Partial F 12.24  
Hansen J (p-value) .36  
* p < .05 
Estimated with robust standard errors clustering schools over time 
Sensitivity Simulations 
The following figures present recorded per-pupil spending in 2007 for urban core (green 
filled triangles) and other elementary schools sharing the same labor market (red hollow circles) by 
the predicted at-risk measure. The sloped trendline in each figure represents the predicted costs of 
providing equal opportunity to achieve the average state outcomes (among included schools) from 
low to high at-risk share. For example, for Texas districts, the predicted per-pupil cost of achieving 
state mean proficiency rates for a school of 0% predicted at-risk is approximately $4,000, and the 
predicted cost per pupil of a school nearing 100% at-risk over $6,000 (approaching $7,000 or a 75% 
difference). Note also that the sloped line cuts roughly through the middle of the plot of all schools, 
intersecting the plot at the point where average spending and average school characteristics are 
associated with average outcomes. This slope derived from the cost model is the same for each 
Texas metropolitan area. What differs is the actual distribution of resources.  
In a predictable, need-based expenditure model, elementary schools would fall roughly along 
the diagonal line or at least parallel to it. That is, within any district the school with 100% at-risk 
would have about 75% higher per pupil budget than the school with 0% at-risk. Benchmarked 
against the hypothetical average school with average spending and average outcomes, a school with 
lower at-risk shares would require less funding to achieve the average outcome, and a school with 
higher at-risk shares would require more funding. Schools above the diagonal line are those with 
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spending more than what is required for achieving the average outcome, and schools below the line 
are those with spending less than required for achieving the average outcome.  
None of the urban districts in Figure 1 displays a clear pattern of alignment with the 
projected costs of equal opportunity. The most problematic scenario is one in which surrounding 
lower-poverty schools that exist in the same labor market for teachers fall well above the need 
adjustment line, but higher-poverty urban core schools fall below that line. This is clearly the case in 
the Dallas metropolitan area. Simply reshuffling resources among Dallas elementary schools may 
place those schools in a pattern parallel to the need-adjusted trendline but cannot simultaneously 
raise them to that line to provide equal opportunity with surrounding schools. That is, one might 
create more equal opportunity within Dallas schools to achieve Dallas’s own average outcome level, 
but one could not reorganize existing resources among these schools to provide equal opportunity 
to achieve the state mean outcome. Meanwhile, all elementary schools with less than 20% at-risk in 
the Dallas metropolitan area have per-pupil budgets above the needs-adjusted trendline. Austin and 
Houston labor markets are less problematic, but they still include substantial numbers of lower-
poverty neighbors spending above the needs-adjusted trendline and higher-poverty urban core 
schools falling below the needs-adjusted trendline. In both districts, however, lower poverty 
elementary schools—those with 20% to 80% at-risk—are somewhat aligned with the need-adjusted 
trendline.  
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Figure 1. Texas simulated marginal at-risk costs. 
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Figure 2. Ohio simulated at-risk marginal costs 
 
Cleveland and Cincinnati schools are both surrounded by many higher-spending schools, with 
most schools in both urban core districts falling below the needs-adjusted trendline. As in 
Dallas, internal reallocation can lead only to greater equality of opportunity to achieve the 
districts’ internal (lower-average) outcome level. That is, if one reshuffles within the same 
budget constraint, all Dallas schools will fall below the diagonal line even if they run parallel to 
it. In the present analysis, I do not consider whether the Dallas school district has access to 
other resources, perhaps presently allocated to secondary schools, to level up elementary 
schools.  
As in Dallas, the lowest-need schools within Cincinnati and Cleveland would end up being 
funded well below spending levels of neighbors having much lower at-risk shares. Columbus schools 
may be best positioned relative to their own labor market to provide per-pupil spending aligned with 
the trendline. Interestingly, in the Columbus Core Based Statistical Area, schools outside of 
Columbus city but with at-risk shares over 40% are disadvantaged. Among non-Columbus city 
schools, higher poverty elementary schools appear to have systematically lower per pupil budgets.  
Finally in Table 7, I use the at-risk cost adjustment represented in the previous figures to 
recalculate coefficients of variation on cost-adjusted (accounting for at-risk populations but not 
school size) per-pupil expenditures across schools within each district. Within Texas, Houston fares 
well compared with Dallas and Austin, though Austin displayed the most consistent positive 
relationship between per-pupil spending and poverty. However, San Antonio has the least amount 
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of variation in cost-adjusted per-pupil spending. In Ohio, Cincinnati fares significantly better than 
either Columbus or Cleveland with regard to cost-adjusted variation in resources across schools, 
though Columbus displays more predictable targeting of funding with respect to at-risk students.  
 
Table 7 
Coefficients of variation for at-risk cost adjusted per pupil expenditures 
City 
At-risk adjusted  
coefficient of variation 
Texas  
Austin 0.16 
Dallas 0.21 
Houston 0.12 
San Antonio 0.11 
Ohio  
Cincinnati 0.09 
Cleveland 0.16 
Columbus 0.17 
Conclusion 
Overall, spending was more predictable and positively associated with poverty and at-risk 
measures in Columbus and Austin, not in Cincinnati and Houston, both of which use Weighted 
Student Funding. But in terms of cost-adjusted variations in resources, both Cincinnati and Houston 
fared well, with Cincinnati displaying greater within-district cost-adjusted equity than other Ohio 
cities, and Houston displaying comparable within-district equity to San Antonio and better than 
either Dallas or Austin. I also found it feasible to apply a two-stage least squares cost function across 
schools with indirect controls for efficiency by using same-grade schools throughout a metropolitan 
area spanning district boundaries. Additional analyses are required to determine the stability of 
marginal cost estimates for children in poverty, children with disabilities, and other potential student 
populations. While earlier single-stage, stochastic frontier models in Washington and Hawaii 
produced relatively modest marginal costs for children in poverty (around 40%), the models herein 
are more consistent with cross-district poverty-related marginal cost estimates, on the order of 75% 
to 100% in additional costs from the school with 0% at-risk to the school with 100% at-risk. Where 
sufficient school-level financial, demographic, and outcome data are available, as in Ohio and Texas, 
it may well be feasible to use two-stage least squares cost function models to guide within-district, 
cross-school budget setting.  
Evaluation of marginal costs and current spending distributions across all schools within 
metropolitan labor markets reveals significant constraints for some large urban districts in the 
samples. While it may technically be possible, in a purely relative sense it may be very difficult for 
less-well-funded urban core districts to reshuffle their resources across schools. Solutions to within-
district resource allocation must take into account and be addressed simultaneously with between 
district allocation. I remain unconvinced that the data make a strong case one way or the other for 
weighted student funding as a district budgeting method to achieve greater rationality in cross-
school expenditures. Districts not using weighted funding appear comparably able to target 
resources to schools with greater student needs. While cross-school equity is a compelling reason to 
consider adopting weighted student funding, there may be other important considerations as well.  
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In the fall of 2007, as New York City was beginning implementation of Fair Student 
Funding, Seattle Public Schools—the model for many others that followed—announced that it 
would abandon weighted student funding, noting that over time, the formula had evolved to 
become too complex and cumbersome for school-level personnel to administer, and the 
decentralized governance strategy made it “difficult to develop carefully coordinated strategies 
between the District and schools” (Seattle Public Schools, 2007, p. 1). Even the other espoused 
virtues of weighted funding—simplicity and transparency—may not be all that pundits have argued. 
Nonetheless, within-district equity in the distribution of resources remains a serious concern and 
one that requires continued attention, regardless of budgeting methods employed. In ongoing 
research, we are exploring financial resource distributions and teacher distributions across schools 
within large districts in multiple states to identify districts that successfully target financial resources 
across schools according to needs and costs, and those districts that have more equitable 
distributions of teacher qualifications across schools. Next, we intend to determine how they got 
that way and uncover district practices and budgeting strategies that lead to greater equity, rather 
than taking the approach of more recent advocacy research which identifies the politically motivated 
solution then seeks to prove that it works.  
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Appendix 
Texas At-Risk Index Model 
Variable  Coefficient SE 
School population   
% Hispanic 0.68* 0.01 
% Black 0.67* 0.01 
% ELL 0.22* 0.02 
District characteristics   
Median family income (natural log) -0.17* 0.01 
% adults with college education  -0.18* 0.03 
Year   
2006 0.004 0.004 
2007 -0.001 0.004 
Core Based Statistical Area   
San Antonio -0.02* 0.01 
Houston -0.02* 0.004 
Austin 0.01** 0.01 
Constant 2.04 0.13 
R2 .87  
* p < .05, ** p < .10 
 
Ohio At-Risk Index Model 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
School population   
% Hispanic 0.73* 0.04 
% Black 0.37* 0.01 
District characteristics   
Median family income (natural log) -0.67* 0.02 
% adults with college education  0.09* 0.04 
Year   
2003 0.14* 0.01 
2004 0.15* 0.01 
2005 0.16* 0.01 
2006 0.19* 0.01 
2007 0.18* 0.01 
Core Based Statistical Area   
Cleveland -0.05* 0.01 
Columbus -0.01 0.01 
Constant 7.07 0.25 
R2 .73  
* p < .05, ** p < .10 
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